This paper contrasts conventional real GDP and price indicators of living standard, interpreted as revealing information on welfare, with others, that aim at re ‡ecting individual freedom. It is argued that freedom-based indices are easier to use and interpret than traditional real GDP ones. Illustrations of the di¤erences between the two classes of indices are provided for international comparisons, as well as for the evaluation of growth and in ‡ation in France.
Introduction
Does the average French citizen have a better standard living now than 10 years ago ? Is the standard of living of an average (South) Korean citizen lower than that of a Portuguese ? What impact on the standard of living of an average person with a given monetary income does changes in prices had in the last year? Those are examples of questions asked -and answered -very commonly. Yet these questions are not easy one to answer. There are at least two main reasons to this di¢ culty.
The …rst one is that the very notion of an "average" individual is abstract. Actual individuals are all di¤erent and experience various changes in living standard over time and/or across countries or states. What happens to the living standard of an "average person" is very likely to be unrepresentative of the reality experienced concretely by a particular person. For the most part, we will not in this paper attempt to avoid this di¢ culty. Hence, we will stick to the common usage of reasoning about an "average citizen", being of course perfectly aware of the abstractness of this notion. We say "for the most part" because we will, on one occasion, discuss the possibility of using conventional indices of living standard with the more ambitious objective of evaluating distributions of living standards among the citizens. Yet we will see that it is rather di¢ cult to do this in a satisfactory way.
The second di¢ culty arises from the very notion of "living standard" that is not an easy one, as noticed, among many others, by Sen (1987) . Virtually all concrete answers given to the questions raised above are expressed in terms of two categories of variables: income and prices. This is not surprising. Most individuals covered by the notion of living standard evolve in market economies where they freely convert their monetary income into goods that satisfy their needs and desires. They do this conversion by paying, for each unit of the good they choose to consume, its market price. Hence knowing someone's monetary income as well as the prices of all goods is enough for knowing the person's purchasing power or, in the economists' jargon the person's budget set. de…ned to be the set of all bundles of goods that are a¤ordable, given prices and the person's income. How can this purchasing power be measured in a simple and ethically meaningful way ? This is the main question to which the various indicators used in practice to measure economic growth, standard of living, or cost of living provide answer.
For many economists and social scientists raised in the so-called welfarist tradition, the importance of the budget set lies, ultimately, in the ability of this set to provide the person who faces it with a bundle of goods that is the source of a high welfare level. It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine in detail the meaning of the notion of welfare that is at stake here (see e.g. Gri¢ n (1986), Sen (1987) , Sen (1991) and Summer (1996) ). It will su¢ ce for our purpose to view, rather vaguely, welfare as an index of the extent to which the individual's preferences are satis…ed. This view is vague because it does not specify what lies behind the person's preferences (i.e. happiness, desire, needs, etc.).
How can a budget set, which comprises many bundles that the individual can a¤ord, be converted into a single welfare level ? The answer usually provided to this question lies in the assumption of "rational choice" by individuals. Given their purchasing power, individuals are indeed assumed to choose a bundle of goods that provide them with the largest possible welfare. This rationality assumption thus connects any budget set to a maximal welfare level. Of course making this connection operational in terms of usable indices of living standard requires additional information on the bundle of goods chosen -by assumption rationally -by an "average person". As mentioned above, and as will be described below, most methods used in practice to evaluate living standards require, in addition of data on prices and income, information on a "representative basket" of goods. Such a representative basket is used to determine the weighted average of prices or to establish PPP conversion of currencies in international comparisons.
This welfarist credo has been looked at with growing skepticism in the last thirty years, thanks notably to the work of Sen (1979) (see also Sen (1985) or Sen (1991) ) and Rawls (1971) . It it is, again, beyond the scope of this paper to discuss and appraise the reasons which have fed this skepticism. It will su¢ ce for our purpose to recognize that the notion of welfare has been considered to be an inadequate, or at least incomplete, ingredient for describing an individual's situation, and that the rationality assumption according to which individuals make welfare maximizing choices given their purchasing power has been questioned even by welfarists themselves (see for instance Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson (2005) ).
As an alternative to welfare, it has been suggested by some to base the appraisal of an individual situation on freedom of choice. There is indeed a long tradition in economics and elsewhere for viewing individual freedom as an important thing, if not the most important thing, in normative appraisal. Members of this tradition in economics include Knight (1947) , Hayek (1960) , Buchanan (1975) and Sen (1988) , among many others. When envisaged from this perspective, the importance of the individual purchasing power lies not so much in the welfare that this purchasing power enables the individual to achieve but, rather, in the freedom of choice that it provides. Making this alternative workable requires of course a de…nition of freedom of choice. The literature, illustrated by the contributions of Jones and Sugden (1982) , Pattanaik and Xu (1990) , Pattanaik and Xu (1998) and Xu (2004) (among many others, see the surveys of Gravel (2006) and Gravel (2009) ) has made signi…cant e¤orts to providing plausible and workable such de…nitions. In a nutshell, freedom of choice tends to be de…ned by the size of the opportunity set faced by an individual. In our context, this amounts to de…ning freedom as the number of bundles of goods that the individual can a¤ord, given income and prevailing prices.
The object of this paper is to illustrate the potential usefulness of empirically implementable summary measures of standard of living that re ‡ect the average individual's freedom of choice, rather than well-being. As we hope to convince the reader, freedom-based measures of standard of living are simpler to use and to construct than welfare-based ones, be it simply because, contrary to the latter, they do not require data on a (more than often arbitrary) "reference basket". Moreover, the use of these measures can be justi…ed by precise axioms that identify their meaning in a crisp way. As we shall recall, few of the most commonly used welfare-based indices are so crisply interpretable in terms of ethical principles. Finally, we will show, using empirical data, that freedom-based indices tend to provide conclusions that are not qualitatively di¤erent from those achieved out of welfare-based indices concerning the evaluation of economic growth, international comparisons of living standard, and measurement of in ‡ation.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. The next section recalls the main welfarist framework in which budget sets are evaluated and discusses the justi…cation given to conventional exercises of measuring growth and in ‡ation, and of performing international comparisons of living standards. The third section discusses how budget sets can be evaluated on the basis of the freedom to consume that they provide and derive a simple method for comparing opportunity sets in this perspective. The fourth section illustrates the di¤erence between standard welfarist-based per capita GDP comparisons and freedom-based ones while section …ve concludes.
2 Welfare-based indices of living standard
Preliminaries
Consider an individual living in a particular community (region, country) at a particular time period (quarter, year). This individual has an income of I units of numéraire that he or she can freely spend on a number, l say, of goods and services available on markets at strictly positive prices p 1 ; :::; p l . The l prices (p 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p l ) and the individual income I de…ne the budget set B(p 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p l ; I) where:
B(p 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p l ; I) = f(x 1 ; :::;
This set, which contains all bundles of goods that the individual can a¤ord, given prices and income, provides therefore a complete description of the individual's purchasing power. While the budget set is completely de…ned by prices and income, it is well-known -and obvious, that it is una¤ected by the choice of the numéraire used to measure prices and income. Doubling all prices and income for instance -or converting euros into rupees -does not a¤ect the set of bundles of goods that are available for choice to the individual. On the other hand the budget set expands if income increases and prices do not change. Conversely, the budget set shrinks if some prices increase and nothing else happens. Things are not so clear when, as is typically the case in practice, prices and income change in various directions simultaneously. It is therefore of some importance to obtain a summary measure of the individual purchasing power.
Welfarist economists believe that individuals obtain welfare out of their consumption of goods and that they choose from their budget set a bundle of goods that provides them the highest welfare. This belief serves as justi…cation for most commonly used indices that aim at measuring individuals living standard. If an individual chooses a bundle of goods in a budget set, one concludes that this chosen bundle o¤ers -at least weakly -more welfare than any other a¤ordable bundle. Hence, under the assumption that individuals make "rational" choices, knowing the chosen bundle in a budget set as well as the prices and income parameters that de…ne this set enables one to perform meaningful comparisons of budget sets. The concept of per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is often used for that purpose.
Real per capita GDP
A common de…nition of GDP is of being the value, at market prices, of all …nal goods and services sold during a given time period in the community. Formally, the GDP of a community i, denoted GDP i , is de…ned by:
where p i j is the price of the good j (j = 1; :::; l) observed in community i (and labelled in the currency used in that community) and X i j is the total quantity of good j sold in that community. When used to appraise individual living standard, GDP is often divided by the number of individuals in the considered community. This per capita GDP can be interpreted as the cost, at the community prices, of the bundle of goods chosen by an average individual in the community. Let x i j = X i jt =n denote the per capita -or average -consumption of good j in community i where n denotes the number of individuals living in i. We assume for the sake of the discussion in this paper that this number of individuals is the same in all communities. What meaning can be given to per capita GDP comparisons across communities?
Not much if one limits oneself to so-called nominal comparisons of GDP that do not account for price changes. Indeed, suppose that we compare two values of per capita GDP. The larger of the two values may be larger because prices are higher and goods consumption is lower, or because prices are lower and good consumption is higher, or because of a combination of the two possibilities. Insofar as it is the bundle of goods chosen by the average individual that matters for appraising, in the welfarist perspective, this individual's living standard, it is important to disentangle somehow changes per capita GDP that are due to price changes from those that are due to changes in quantities. The typical way to do this disentanglement is to compare the two GDP levels at a common set of prices. When one does this, one is comparing what are called real per capita GDP levels.
Welfare meaning of real per capita GDP comparisons
To be speci…c, consider two communities h and i. The two communities can be truly distinct communities such as Korea and Portugal. But they could also be the same community observed at two di¤erent time periods (say France in 2007 and France in 2008). Suppose we are given, for these two communities, prices and per capita consumptions observed in them. On the basis of this information, when can we say unambiguously that the average individual in one community has higher welfare than that of the other ? Here is a test that answers this question:
GDP in community i is weakly higher than the cost, at community i's prices, of the average community h's chosen bundle), then community i's average individual is weakly better o¤ than he or she would be with the average community h bundle.
The logic underlying this test is as follows. If inequality :; x h l ). Moreover, if we assume that individuals are never satiated, it is possible to derive the stronger conclusion that, if the strict inequality
is observed (per capita GDP in i is strictly larger than the cost, at i's prices, of community h's bundle), the average individual in i achieves a strictly higher welfare than he or she would get with the bundle chosen in h. Indeed, the strict inequality means that, at i's prices, the average individual in i would have spent less money on the bundle chosen in h than on his or her chosen bundle. If this individual can not be satiated, and is rational, then the only reason why he or she would accept to spend strictly more money on a bundle is if the bundle provides strictly more welfare.
GDP is higher in community h than the cost, at h's prices, of the bundle consumed by the average individual in community i), then the average consumer in community h is weakly better o¤ than he or she would be if she was consuming community i's bundle.
The logic underlying this test works just as for test 1. If the bundle chosen by community h's average individual is more expensive, at h prices, than that chosen community i, rationality of h's choice implies that the welfare achieved with the choice is no smaller than what it would have been with the a¤ordable community i bundle. As for the previous test, a stricter version of conclusion can be obtained if individuals can be assumed to be non-satiated with respect to their welfare achievement. While these two tests provide a welfare-based justi…cation for making real GDP comparisons across communities, they are not free from interpretational di¢ culties. Indeed, suppose …rst that the two inequalities:
hold simultaneously and that one of the two inequalities is strict. This means that the average individual in community i is better o¤ than he or she would be with the bundle chosen by the average individual in community h and, conversely, that the later individual is better o¤ with his or her choice than with community i's bundle, with at least one of the two "better o¤" statement being strict. If the average individuals in the two communities di¤er, this conclusion is not logically troublesome. It is, after all, possible that the average Korean individual prefers his or her average bundle to that chosen by the average Portuguese and that the Portuguese has converse preferences. Yet this possibility does render di¢ cult the ranking of Portugal and Korea on the basis of welfare. If Koreans are happier in Korea than they would be in Portugal while Portuguese are happier in Portugal than they would be in Korea, which of the two countries provides the best standard of living ?
In order to avoid this di¢ culty, researchers often assume that average individuals of the various communities have the same welfare function and would therefore, if rational, make the same choice in front of the same budget set. This assumption is somewhat defensible for comparisons applying a given community (say France) observed at two adjacent time periods (say 2007 and 2008) . It seems indeed plausible that the preference of an average French individual has not changed much during that period. But making this assumption does not free one from the interpretational di¢ culties of observing simultaneously inequalities (2) and (3), at least if one of them is strict. Indeed, in that case, inequality (2) indicates that our (unique) individual is better o¤ in community i than in community h while inequality (3) indicates that the same individual has opposite preference. In the economic jargon, the occurrence of these two inequalities for the same individual represents a violation of the (weak) axiom of revealed preferences (see e.g. Samuelson (1948) for an early statement of revealed preferences theory and Varian (2006) for a recent survey). This violation is plainly incompatible with the rationality postulate that individuals choose in their budget set a preferred basket of goods. But if individuals do not make rational choices, it is di¢ cult to interpret real per capita GDP …gures from a welfarist point of view. It is di¢ cult to attach ethical meanings to real per capita GDP comparisons. In any case therefore, observing simultaneously (2) and (3) raises serious problems of interpretation.
Another di¢ culty arises if none of the two inequalities (2) and (3) is observed. In that case, it can neither be said that the average individual in community h is better o¤ than what he or she would be with the basket consumed by the average community i individual nor that the average community i individual is better o¤ with his or her chosen basket than with the basket chosen by the average individual of community h. The simultaneous violation of inequalities (2) and (3) is simply uninformative on the welfare levels achieved by the average individuals in the two communities. This is so irrespective of whether or not the individuals in the two communities can be assumed to have the same preference.
The following There are three obvious limitations to the welfarist interpretations of real per capita GDP comparisons discussed in the preceding subsection. First, as mentioned in introduction, the interpretation is expressed in terms of the welfare of an abstract "average individual" who may not well represent the unequally distributed well-being of the concrete individuals in the compared communities. Second, comparisons of real per capita GDP may be uninformative if none of the inequalities (2) and (3) are true. Third, comparisons of per capita GDP may be di¢ cult to interpret if both inequalities (2) and (3) are true. Indeed in that case, either there are con ‡icting views among preferences as to which community o¤ers the highest welfare or, if the same average preference is assumed in both communities, the observed choice of baskets of goods is not rational with respect to any single preference. For certain types of comparisons of communities, it is possible to provide a somewhat di¤erent welfarist interpretation of GDP tests that avoids the …rst two limitations. On the other hand, there is no easy way out of the third limitation. The kinds of comparisons that enable such an alternative interpretation concern situations involving what could be called "small " changes in prices, income and quantities. Some comparisons of GDP made in practice concern, indeed, situations that are not very distant from each other. This is clearly the case when one is interested in comparing France in 2007 with France in 2008, or when one compares countries with similar consumption patterns and price levels.
Speci…cally, take communities h and i again and assume that the num-
p h j x h j and dp j = p i j p h j that measure di¤erences, respectively, in per capita GDP and prices between the two communities are "small" relative to the observed levels of income and prices. There is no precise de…nition of what "small" means. Let us simply say that the results that we are about to describe will be all the more accurate as the changes in prices and income are small. These results will enable one to provide a welfare interpretation of GDP comparisons that is more conclusive than those underlying the two tests discussed previously. Moreover, the conclusion thus obtained will not concern a single average individual only but, instead, the whole community of individuals considered. This requires of course that something be said on the criterion used to normatively evaluate a community as a whole. All individuals living in such a community -call it h -are assumed to face common prices (p h 1 ; ::::; p h l ). Yet these individuals can di¤er by their income and by the function they use to convert income and prices into welfare, after making rational choices from their budget set. Speci…cally, for an individual k (with k = 1; :::; n) living in h, we denote by I hk his or her income and by V k (p 1 ; ::::; p l ; I) the maximal welfare that this individual can achieve, when endowed with an income of I and facing prices (p 1 ; ::::; p l ). Welfarist economists evaluate a community on the sole basis of its distribution of welfare levels (V 1 ; :::; V n ). This evaluation is made by assigning a number W (V 1 ; :::; V n ) to any such distribution of welfare levels. Such a number -interpreted as an index of social welfare -is assigned to each distribution of welfare level by the social welfare function W . Such a function summarizes the welfarist ethics used to make normative evaluation in the community. Philosophers and economists have examined various forms that such a social welfare function can take. It is for instance commonly held that W should be increasing with respect to individual welfare so that the ethics is not of a sadistic variety. It is also typically assumed that W is a quasi-concave function of individual welfare so that the ethics has a weak preference for welfare equality, everything else being the same. Two particular functions have received considerable attention. One is the so-called Maxi-min social welfare function that cares only about the welfare of the worst-o¤ individual in the society, and which exhibits in…nite aversion to welfare inequality. The other is the classical Utilitarian one that is concerned with the sum of individual welfares and which exhibits therefore a neutrality attitude (no preference, no distaste) for welfare inequality. But it is certainly possible to envisage other form of social welfare functions, even though, as shown in the seminal work of Deschamps and Gevers (1978) , there are good reasons for limiting attention to these two particular cases.
For our purpose, we leave completely unspeci…ed the social welfare function used by community h and we simply consider the function according to which the observed distribution of income in that community is optimal. The assumption of an optimal income distribution means that, in the set of all logically conceivable ways of distributing the observed GDP of this community, the current income distribution is considered to be best for the ethics represented by the social welfare function. If this is the case, the observed distribution of incomes (I h1 ; ::::; I hn ) is the solution of the following program: 
As such, if the income distribution provides everyone with a positive amount of income, it satis…es the necessary …rst order conditions for a maximum (under the usual di¤erentiability conditions):
and for some strictly positive number a. This condition simply says that if income is optimally distributed in the community, then the ethical bene…t of giving an additional euro to someone is equalized -to some number aacross individuals. Given (4), consider the impact, on the distribution of welfare in community h, of bringing prices and individual incomes to what they are in community i. If the prices and income changes required by this move are small, their impact on social welfare, denoted dW , can be approximated by:
where, for every individual k, dI k = I ik I hk and, for community j = h; i, I jk is the income achieved by individual k in community j. Of course, by de…nition of GDP one has:
Using equation (4), condition (5) can also be written as:
Using Roy's identity, we can alternatively write equation (7) as:
or, using (6) and the de…nition of GDP provided by (1):
Since a is a positive number if income is optimally distributed in h, the sign of the right hand side of this expression is determined exclusively by the sign
Hence, equality (8) provides the following alternative real GDP test:
Alternative real GDP test 1: Distribution of well-being is ethically better in i than in h for the ethics that considers optimal the income distribution in h if and only if GDP (or per capita GDP) is higher in i than in h when the two GDPs are compared at community i's prices.
Using an analogous reasoning, but looking at things from the view point of the (possibly di¤erent) community i's ethics, one can obtain an analogous alternative real GDP test 2.
Alternative real GDP test 2: Distribution of well-being is ethically better in i than in h for the ethics that considers optimal the income distribution in i if and only if GDP (or per capita GDP) is higher in i than in h when the two GDPs are compared at community h's prices.
An important di¤erence between these alternative tests and those described previously is that the alternative tests provide de…nite answers in terms of welfare comparisons. Indeed, per capita GDP evaluated at community i's prices is higher in i than in h if and only if the distribution of welfare is better in i than in h for the ethics that considers optimal the distribution of income in h. Hence, with the alternative tests, we can never be in the inconclusive fourth line of the table above. Of course it can happen that real per capita GDP is higher in i than in h when i's prices are used but higher in h than in i when the two are compared at h prices. If this is the case, one must conclude either that the social welfare function that judges optimal the income distribution in i is di¤erent than that which judges optimal the income distribution in h, or that individuals do not make rational choices and, therefore, that Roy's identity does not apply. This problem is similar to the one encountered for the …rst two GDP tests concerning opposing individual preferences with respect to the two average bundles.
While the possibility provided by these two alternative tests of drawing ethical conclusion on the distribution of welfares, rather than on the welfare of an abstract average individual, may be seen as an advantage, the fragility of the ethical conclusion thus obtained is worth stressing. The conclusion is based, indeed, on the ethics that considers optimal the actual distribution of income observed in one of the communities under comparison. Suppose that the communities are France in 2007 and France in 2008. It is not clear to us that the ethics that considers optimal the distribution of income in France in either of the two years would command widespread support.
GDP-based indices of living standards in practice
When using GDP-based indices to evaluate standards of living in applied work, few practitioners connect these to welfarist theory in the way just described. Rather, they simply compare GDP, either across time or across countries, using a common set of prices and do not interpret their comparisons in terms of well-being. The meaning of these comparisons is therefore doubtful. An exception to this is the vast literature, nicely surveyed in Diewert (2007) , that deals with the economic approach to index numbers. While this literature bases index numbers on explicit utility maximization the connections with welfarism are not explicitely spelled out and the arguments are not presented in terms of revealed preferences. Yet, the interpretation of the economic approach to index numbers is is formally similar to that discussed above.
In applied work, there are at least three main instances where GDPbased comparisons of living standard are performed: 1) the evolution over time of the GDP for a given community (the issue of economic growth).
2) the international comparisons of per capita GDP
3) The evolution over time of prices, and the measurement of in ‡ation.
Measurement of economic growth.
Economic growth is commonly de…ned to be the rate of growth of real GDP, or sometimes per capita GDP, of a community between two points of time.
In principle, this measurement of economic growth is nothing else than a particular instance of the comparison discussed above, where communities h and i are taken to be the same community observed at two points of time (say that i is current time and h is an early period). In practice however, growth measurement proceeds by dividing GDP of the periods by a price index and by calling the result of this division a real GDP. The growth rate is then de…ned to be the rate of variation of this real GDP. A price index for a community i is the ratio of the cost of a reference bundle at prices prevailing in that community to the cost of the reference bundle at some reference price. Formally, let (x r 1 ; :::; x r l ) be some reference bundle of the l goods and let p r 1 ; :::; p r l be the reference prices. Then, the price index of community i for these reference prices and bundles, denoted P i r , is de…ned by:
and the so-called real GDP of community i, denoted \ GDP i , is given by:
One then de…nes real growth rate between periods h and i to be:
What meaning can be given to this growth rate or, equivalently, to the ratio
? Using (9) and (10), this ratio writes:
It is clearly di¢ cult to interpret this expression further if nothing is said on the reference bundle of goods. Very commonly, one assumes that the reference bundle is the one consumed in one of the two periods under consideration. If for instance we assume that the bundle consumed in h is used as reference, then the ratio can be written as:
In this case, having the ratio greater than one and, therefore, growth positive is equivalent to requiring:
This inequality can be interpreted using the logic underlying the GDP test above (welfare is larger in community i than in community h). A similar conclusion could be obtained using community i's prices as references. Of course, in performing this measurement of growth, it is important to check that growth is positive for both sets of prices (community h and i). If growth is positive for one set of price and negative for another, one would be in the interpretatively di¢ cult situation analogous to that of the third line of the table above. It is also worth recalling that, if a positive growth rate is indicative of an improvement in social -under alternative GDP tests -or average -if the two …rst GDP test are used -welfare in a community observed at two points of time, the comparison of growth rates between di¤erent communities is di¢ cult to interpret if the GDP of the two communities are evaluated at di¤erent sets of prices.
International comparisons of per capita GDP
When international comparisons of GDP are involved, one faces the issue of expressing prices and incomes into a common numéraire. Since the budget set, and therefore the rational choice made from this set, is una¤ected by the choice of the numéraire, there is no problem in doing this. More than often, it is the US dollar that is used as numéraire so that all prices and incomes are expressed in that currency, using exchange rates prevailing at the time where the currency conversions are performed. Of course, comparisons of nominal per capita GDP expressed in US dollars have no meaning if di¤erent prices prevail in the compared communities. It is to address this issue that many per capita GDP comparisons use so-called Purchasing Power Parities (PPP) conversion factors to correct for price di¤erences between communities. A PPP conversion factor is a rate of exchange of the numéraire in terms of some international standard, typically taken to be the value, at some reference prices (p r 1 ; :::; p r ) expressed in US dollars, of a reference bundle of goods (x r 1 ; :::; x r l ). In that context, the ratio:
is de…ned to be the PPP exchange rate of community i. Notice that this ratio is nothing else than the inverse of the price index de…ned previously. In the current context, this ratio is interpreted to be the amount of community i's currency that is required for each US dollar spent on the reference bundle.
In that context, the PPP adjusted per capita GDP of community i, noted gdp i is de…ned to be:
What can be the meaning of PPP adjusted per capita comparisons ? Specifically, assume that PPP adjusted per capita GDP is higher in community i than in community h so that inequality:
holds. What can be inferred from this information ? As is clear, and as was the case for growth measurement, the answer to this question depends upon the choice of the reference bundle that enters into the de…nition of PPP. Suppose for instance that one uses the bundle consumed by the average country h's individual as reference so that x r j = x h j for any good j. In that case, the above inequality writes:
so that it implies (GDP test 1) that the average individual in community i prefers his or her bundle to that consumed in h. Yet in order to make per capita GDP comparisons comparable between more than two countries, the reference bundle used in PPP conversion factor is seldom, if ever, the bundle chosen by one of the two compared countries. One …nds, instead, alternative more or less "objective" reference bundles, ranging from the Big Mac sandwich advocated by the magazine The Economist -to more sophisticated bundles that aim at representing the average "world citizen" choice. Yet, for an arbitrary reference bundle that is unconnected with the two compared communities, inequality (12) carries no meaning whatsoever in terms of welfare. Hence no ethically meaningful conclusions can be derived from PPP adjusted per capita GDP comparisons the way they are usually conducted.
Measurement of the cost of living and in ‡ation
As performed by several statistical agencies -including the French INSEEin ‡ation rate is de…ned to be the rate of increase -in percentage -of average prices between two periods (say h and i, with i being the most recent period). Average prices are, again, calculated as the price of a reference bundle of goods (x r 1 ; :::; x r l ) or, alternatively, as a weighted average of the prices, with the weights given by the quantitative importance of the corresponding good in the reference bundle. With such a reference bundle, the rate of increase in prices -or in ‡ation rate -between period h and i, denoted P , is de…ned by:
There are two main approaches for selecting the reference bundle used in the de…nition of the in ‡ation rate. One is the so-called Laspeyres approach.
It de…nes the reference to be the bundle consumed by the average individual in the earlier period h. The other is the Paasche approach that takes as reference the bundle consumed in the most recent i period.
What is the meaning of the rate of in ‡ation ? Not much in itself. Indeed, if nothing is known about the evolution of the income of the individual who is facing the prices described in this rate, it is di¢ cult to say anything about the welfare impact of prices changes. In common discussions, it is usually assumed that in ‡ation measures a depreciation of purchasing power -or of welfare -of someone who has a …xed income. Is this assumption correct? Speci…cally can we infer something on the change in welfare experienced by an individual with a given income between two periods from the in ‡ation rate prevailing between the two periods? The answer to this question is positive if either the Paasche or the Laspeyres approach is used to de…ne in ‡ation.
Notice …rst that we can de…ne the income of the average individual in any period to be the per capita GDP of the community in that period (under the assumption that the individual consumes all his or her income, or, alternatively, that saving is included in the list of goods). If we do that, we can conclude from the observation that in ‡ation -as measured the Paasche approach -is higher than the rate of growth of the individual income that individual welfare has decreased between the two period. Indeed having a larger in ‡ation rate, in the Paasche sense, than the rate of growth in income means that inequality:
holds or, equivalently, that:
holds so that, following the logic of the above GDP tests, the average individual at period h prefers his or her bundle of goods to that consumed by the (possibly di¤erent) average individual in period 2. A special case of this rule applies if there are no income changes. In that case, a positive in ‡ation rate in the Paasche sense implies a welfare loss for the average individual in community h. In a somewhat analogous line, suppose that in ‡ation, as measured by the Laspeyres' approach, is lower than the rate of income growth so that the inequality:
holds. Then, following the reasoning of earlier GDP test, we conclude that the bundle consumed by the average individual in period i is preferred by this individual to that consumed in period h. Applying this result to the particular case where income does not change between the two periods, we conclude from this that a negative in ‡ation, in the Laspeyres sense, is indicative of a welfare gain of the average consumer in period i. Of course, if Laspeyres'in ‡ation is positive and Paasche in ‡ation is negative, then we are faced with an indeterminacy if we follow the logic of the two …rst tests.
In the same vein, if Laspeyres in ‡ation is negative and Paasche in ‡ation is positive, we conclude in con ‡icting views of welfare changes between the two periods or in a violation of the individual rationality. Using equation (8), and assuming zero changes in income, we can equivalently conclude, more strongly, that Laspeyres and Paasche in ‡ation are equivalent to ethical worsening in the sense of the two alternative tests if price changes are small.
Limitations of welfare-based measures of living standards
Let us summarize the limitation of the welfare-based measures of standard of living described so far.
1) In order to make meaningful welfare-based comparisons of living standard, information must be available on good prices, average income (or GDP) and a reference bundle.
2) Even when all this information is available, there are instances where comparisons of living standards do not carry any ethical meaning 3) When ethical meaning can be assigned to comparisons of living standard, this ethical meaning always rides on the strong assumption of rational individual behavior.
As will now be seen, these three limitations can be overcome by using di¤erent indicators of living standards based on individual freedom of choice, rather than welfare. Freedom-based indicators require information on prices and income but not on a reference bundle of goods. Moreover meaningful comparisons of freedom-based indicators can be obtained in all circumstances without any additional assumption on the individual behavior or on the fact that di¤erences between communities are not small. The price to pay for this bene…t is to accept the ethical idea to replace welfare by freedom of choice as the proper aspect of an individual situation to be looked at. Another limitation of freedom-based indicators is that they do not lead to meaningful conclusions about the distribution of individual freedoms even when the di¤erences between communities are small.
Freedom-based indices of standard of living
The freedom that an individual has to make the choices he or she may want to make, irrespective of whether or not he or she will actually make them, is clearly an important dimension of the individual situation. According to some philosophers, it could also be one of the most important such dimension. Alexis de Toqueville for instance wrote some time ago that freedom is the most important aspect of an individual situation and adds that "the man who asks of freedom anything other than itself is born to be a slave".
Yet agreement with Alexis de Toqueville is not necessary for recognizing the importance of freedom of choice for human beings. It is quite possible to argue that freedom is important not only for itself -as de Toqueville claimed -but, also, for the bene…t that it provides in terms, say, of a higher welfare. After all, an individual who cares about welfare and makes choices with the objective of achieving as much welfare as possible will bene…t from having his or her freedom enlarged. It is therefore quite possible to hold the view that freedom is important even in an instrumental perspective of enabling individuals to achieve better -welfare-wise say -outcomes. Can we design numerical indicators of individual freedom that could lead to intertemporal and international comparisons ?
A relatively recent literature in economics has made some progress toward answering this question. The notion of freedom captured by this literature is that of opportunity or power to do things. Individuals are described as facing opportunity sets and as making, in a further stage, choice from these sets. Freedom is envisaged, in this perspective, before choices are made and the question addressed is that of measuring the freedom o¤ered by an opportunity set. Measurement of freedom is achieved very often through axiomatic reasoning. That is, simple properties that plausible account of the statement "o¤ers more freedom than" could verify are speci…ed and the measures of freedom that satisfy these properties, if any, are logically deducted. A measure of freedom of choice that has appeared very often from this axiomatic work is the number of available options.
We are in this paper interested in economic opportunities as these are speci…ed by the budget set of the individual. In a recent work, Xu (2004) has provided an axiomatic justi…cation for using a speci…c measure of the "size" of the budget set: its volume. The volume of the budget set can be seen as the number of bundles of goods available to the individual facing the set. Ranking opportunity sets on the basis of their number of available options has been suggested by many (see e.g. Hayek (1960) , Jones and Sugden (1982) , Suppes (1987) , Pattanaik and Xu (1990) , Carter (1999) , VanHees (2000) as a plausible de…nition of freedom of choice. The connection between the volume of a budget set and the number of bundles that the set o¤ers is easily seen if we assume that goods are available in discrete amounts: 0, 1, 2, etc. units. The volume of the budget set is nothing else than a continuous approximation of the number of distinct bundles of goods that the individual can a¤ord, given his or her budget set.
From a mathematical point of view, the volume of the budget set B(p 1 ; :::; p l ; I), denoted v(p 1 ; :::; p l ; I), is de…ned by: 
Hence, with this speci…cation, the freedom of choice o¤ered by a budget set is measured by the ratio of the income over the geometric mean of the prices. Notice that no reference bundle is required for de…ning freedom in this fashion. Is this measure of freedom plausible ? Yes if one believes that the following three axioms should be satis…ed by any freedom-based ranking of budget sets.
Axiom 1 (Monotonicity) If the budget set B contains the budget set B 0 as a subset, then B o¤ ers no less freedom than B 0 and if B contains B 0 as a proper subset, then B o¤ ers strictly more freedom than B 0 .
Axiom 2 (Invariance with respect to units of measurement) Suppose that budget B(p 1 ; :::; p l ; I) o¤ ers weakly more freedom of choice than B(p 0 1 ; :::; p 0 l ; I 0 ).
Then for any good j that has a strictly positive price in the two budgets, we must also have that budget B(p 1 ; :::; p j 1 ; p j ; p j+1 ; :::; p l ; I) o¤ ers weakly more freedom than budget B(p 0 1 ; :::; p 0 j 1 ; p 0 j ; p 0 j+1 ; :::; p 0 l ; I 0 ) for any strictly positive real number .
Axiom 3 (symmetry between goods) Suppose that budget B(p 1 ; :::; p l ; I) offers weakly more freedom than budget set B(p 0 1 ; :::; p 0 l ; I 0 ). Then, if the prices ( 1 ; :::; l ) result from a permutation of the prices (p 1 ; :::; p l ), it must be that B( 1 ; :::; l ; I) o¤ ers also weakly more freedom than B(p 0 1 ; :::; p 0 l ; I 0 ).
The monotonicity axiom is natural. It says that changes in prices and income that do not reduce the a¤ordability of any bundle can not reduce freedom. It says also that changes in prices and income that leave a¤ordable all bundles to which the consumer had previously access and that make a¤ordable bundles that were not so before strictly increase freedom. It seems quite di¢ cult to think of a conception of freedom of choice that would violate this axiom and that would, therefore, consider that enlarging the set of available options could, in some circumstances, reduce freedom.
The axiom of Invariance with respect to units of measurement is also somewhat natural. It says that changing the unit of measurement of any good should not change the ranking of budget sets in terms of their freedom. For instance, suppose that good j refers to a particular brand of beer and that the quantity of beer is measured in bottles of half a litre. Hence for that unit of measurement, the price of beer is the amount of numéraire that the individual must pay to get one bottle of half a litre of beer. Suppose it is considered, for this method of measuring units of beer, that budget set B(p 1 ; :::; p j 1 ; p j ; p j+1 ; :::; p l ; I) o¤ers more freedom than budget set B(p 0 1 ; :::; p 0 j 1 ; p 0 j ; p 0 j+1 ; :::; p 0 l ; I 0 ). What the axiom says is that this verdict should not be a¤ected by a change in the unit of measurement of beer. Suppose for instance that we decide to measure beer in litres rather than in bottles of half a litre. This means that the price of beer in the …rst budget, which was p j units of numéraire for half a liter, will now become 2p j units of numéraire per liter. Similarly, in the second budget the price of beer will move from p 0 j units of currency per bottle of half a litre to 2p 0 j units of currency per litre. The axiom says that changing the unit of measurement in this fashion does not a¤ect the ranking of the two budget sets.
The axiom of symmetry between goods is clearly more disputable. It says that the nature of the goods involved does not matter for freedom appraisal. Speci…cally, consider a budget set B(p 1 ; :::; p l ; I) and assume that this budget set o¤ers more freedom than an alternative budget set B(p 0 1 ; :::; p 0 l ; I 0 ). Consider now permuting the prices of some (or all) of the goods in such a way that, say, the price of butter becomes the price of housing and the price of housing becomes the price of butter. Let us denote as ( 1 ; :::; l ) the result of this price permutation. The axiom requires that the freedom standing of the budget set B( 1 ; :::; l ; I) with the prices permuted in this fashion vis-à-vis B(p 0 1 ; :::; p 0 l ; I 0 ) should be the same as the standing of the original (unpermuted) budget set B(p 1 ; :::; p l ; I). Should it really? Suppose that budget sets B(p 1 ; :::; p l ; I) and B(p 0 1 ; :::; p 0 l ; I 0 ) di¤er only by the fact that, in the …rst budget, housing price is signi…cantly lower while butter price is mildly higher. In particular, all other prices and income are the same in the two budget sets. It is plausible that, in such a situation, the …rst budget set could be considered as o¤ering more freedom of choice than the second. It is plausible that a sharp drop in housing price signi…cantly enlarge freedom of choice even when accompanied by a small increase in the butter price. Yet this does not need to entail that a symmetric sharp drop in butter price accompanied by a mild increase in housing price also enlarge freedom of choice. This is clear if housing is perceived as being "more important", as a good, than butter. Yet the symmetry axiom rules out the possibility for some good to be a priori more important than another. This axiom imposes on all goods to have the same importance in terms of their contribution to freedom.
Comparing budget sets on the basis of their volume as per formula (15) is tightly connected to these three axioms. Speci…cally, Xu (2004) has shown that the only re ‡exive, complete and transitive ranking of budget sets that satis…es the three axioms is the ranking according to their volume, as de…ned by formula (15). Hence, accepting monotonicity, invariance with respect to the unit of measurement of the goods and symmetry between goods forces one to accepting to measure freedom by formula (15) and, conversely, endorsing formula (15) as a good measure of freedom entails accepting the three axioms. In that sense, the meaning of formula (15) as a measure of freedom of choice is clear: It is precisely that which de…nes freedom of choice in terms of the axioms.
Yet, as argued above, the symmetry axiom that forces all goods to have the same importance may be considered suspicious. Can we obtain implementable indices for comparing budget sets on the basis of freedom without imposing symmetry ? It turns out that we can, at least if we accept to restrict attention to continuous rankings of budget sets. The mathematical property of continuity appears, we believe, quite acceptable in our context. It says that small changes in prices and/or income should not lead to big changes in the ranking of two budget sets. More precisely, if one set is ranked strictly above another, then the verdict should be robust to arbitrarily small perturbations in prices and income. Let us state this property formally.
Axiom 4 (Continuity). For any two budgets B(p 1 ; :::; p l ; I) and B(q 1 ; :::; q l ; I 0 ) such that B(p 1 ; :::; p l ; I) o¤ ers strictly more freedom than B(q 1 ; :::; q l ; I 0 ), there exists a number " > 0 such that B(p " 1 ; :::; p " l ; I " ) o¤ ers strictly more freedom than B(q 1 ; :::; q l ; I 0 ) and that B(p 1 ; :::; p l ; I) o¤ ers strictly more freedom than B(q " 1 ; :::; q " l ; I "0 ) for all combinations of prices and income (p " 1 ; :::; p " l ; I " ) and (q " 1 ; :::; q " l ; I "0 ) such that j p " j p j j ", j q " j q j j ", j I " I j " and j I " 0 I 0 j " for j = 1; :::; l.
If we restrict attention to continuous rankings of budget sets in this sense, then we can justify measuring freedom by a formula similar to (15), but that allows prices at the denominator to be raised to any exponent whatsoever (and not only to for some strictly positive numbers ( 1 ; :::; l ) that can be chosen, without loss of generality, in such a way that they sum to one. Formula (15) is clearly a particular case of such a function that imposes the additional assumption that 1 = 2 = ::: = l = 1 l . While measuring freedom of choice by a function f that can be written as per (16) has the advantage of allowing the prices of the various goods to be treated di¤erently (e.g. housing price may have a bigger exponent than chocolate price), it does not provide any indication as to the choice of the appropriate exponent.
Let us now establish, in the following proposition, that comparing budget sets on the basis of a function f that can be written as per (16) is the only continuous way to rank budget sets that satisfy monotonicity and invariance with respect to units of measurement. This simple proposition rides heavily on theorem 4.7 of Candeal and Induráin (1995).
Proposition 1 Assume that income and prices are strictly positive. Then, a continuous, re ‡exive, complete and transitive ranking of budget sets satis…es monotonicity and invariance from units of measurement if and only if it is based on a function f which can be written as per (16) Proof. If income is strictly positive, a budget set B(p 1 ; ::; p l ; I) is de…ned by the l "normalized" prices ( 1 ; :::; l ) de…ned by j = p j =I for j = 1; :::; l. Hence, ranking budget sets amounts to ranking vectors of such normalized prices. If the ranking is re ‡exive, complete, transitive and continuous, and if all normalized prices can be considered, then by Debreu (1954) theorem, there exists a function : R l + ! R that numerically represents it. That is to say budget B(p 1 ; ::; p l ; I) o¤ ers weakly more freedom than budget B(q 1 ; ::; q l ; I 0 ) if and only if (p 1 =I; ::; p l =I) (q 1 =I 0 ; ::; q l =I 0 ). Clearly, the ranking is monotonic with respect to set inclusion if and only if is decreasing with respect to each of its l argument. It can also be checked that if the ranking satis…es invariance from units of measurement, it satis…es the property of multiplicative invariance of Candeal and Induráin (1995) (def. 4.6). For this reason, theorem 4.7 of Candeal and Induráin (1995) (which requires to be de…ned on R l ++ ) applies so that can be written as Basing comparisons of living standard on either formula (15) or (16) is easy. One only needs to know the (average) income in a community and the l prices that prevail, an information that is required anyway to perform conventional GDP-based comparisons. Yet, contrary to conventional GDPcomparisons, one does not need to assume anything on a representative bundle of goods. Moreover, as was said, all comparisons of communities on the basis of either formulas (15) or (16) can be interpreted in terms of freedom of choice, and the interpretation is crisply expressed in terms of the axioms used in the characterization of each of these two formulas. However, measuring standard of living by formula (16) requires one to specify the exponents j which weight the prices of the various goods. Theory does not provide us any guidance to make this choice. A possibility, explored in the next section, is to weight each price according to the budget share of the good in some "reference" budget. This however reintroduces the need of choosing the reference budget. Moreover, it is noteworthy that if one weights prices as per the good's budget share in some reference budget, then, the ranking of budget sets based on formula (16) coincide with that obtained with the so-called Törnqvist-Theil family of index numbers (see e.g. Diewert (1976) and the discussion in Diewert (2007)). Of course the interpretation of the two formulas -freedom-based here and welfarist-based in Diewert (1976) -is quite di¤erent. Moreover, it is not clear that weighting prices as per budget shares in some actual budget is the natural thing to do under the freedom-based interpretation of formula (16) . If the prices of some of the goods -like education or health -are subsidized, then weighting these prices as per the budget share devoted to the spending on these goods may underestimate the contribution of these goods to freedom.
In the next section, we illustrate how freedom-based comparisons of living standards can be made and compared with conventional GDP-welfare based ones.
Freedom vs Welfare based indices: an empirical appraisal 4.1 Measurement of growth in France
We …rst show how conventional evaluation of growth rate of real per capita GDP, as per formula (11), compares with that of the growth rate of freedom as measured either by the symmetric formula (15), or by some nonsymmetric speci…cation of (16) . Data used in these calculations come from the National Account provided by INSEE (Comptes nationaux -Base 2000, Insee). The data provides information on GDP at 2000 prices. GDP at current prices for di¤erent years are then calculated using in ‡ation rates provided by INSEE (and calculated as per the Laspeyres method). Determining the value of the product of prices raised at speci…c powers -as per the denominators of expressions (15) and (16) -requires of course data on the price for each good. Yet we did not have access to data on individual prices. Hence we had to resort to the imperfect alternative of using average price indices for 82 categories of goods and treating each of these price index as if it was the price of a single good. The price index for each group of good is calculated by INSEE using the Laspeyres method. To that extent, our calculation of the product of prices raised at speci…c exponents is slightly inconsistent because it takes the product of price indices which are themselves weighted sums of more disaggregated prices. This inconsistency must be kept in mine when comparing the measurement of growth provided by the di¤erent methods. The de…nition of the goods categories is provided in appendix A. We have considered several weighting scheme of prices in the de…nition of freedom as per (16) . The …rst is the symmetric one provided by (15). For the others, we have raised the price of each good at an exponent given by the good's budget share -de…ned as the ratio of the expenditure on the good over total income -in various reference situations. Two reference situations are the expenditure pattern for France in 1997 and in 2007. The exact values of the budget shares of the various goods in France for each of the two years are also given in Appendix A. As can be seen from this appendix, budget shares calculated by INSEE are somewhat surprising for certain categories of goods. For instance, according to INSEE, an average French individual devoted only 6.88% of his or her income to housing in 2007. This comes from the fact that INSEE attributes zero housing expenses to all households who own their housing. This is clearly problematic. Because of these limitations, we have also present measures of growth in freedom in which good prices are raised at exponents as per the these goods budget shares in the average Congo and US budgets. As these two weightings are based on the World Bank data used for our international comparisons (see next section), they use a coarser aggregation of the goods into categories than that provided by INSEE. Figure 2 compares welfare-based growth rates of real GDP and growth rate of freedom under the …ve speci…cations of weighing of prices. Growth rate of GDP are calculated, for each year, using both the price of the previous year and the price of the current year as the reference price. As can be seen, growth measurement appears to be somewhat sensitive to the choice of the indicator. Freedom-based indicators who use the weighting of prices as per French budget shares tend to provide an evaluation of real growth that is quite in tune with what is provided by usual real per capita GDP methods. This is of course not surprising given what has been said above with respect to the possible interpretation of freedom-based indicators as Törnqvist-Theil indices. To a lower extent, this congruence between freedom-based and welfare-based evaluation of growth is also observed when freedom is evaluated by a speci…cation of formula (16) that uses US shares as price exponents. On the other hand the appraisal of growth is quite di¤erent if symmetric weighting of all prices (as per formula (15)) is used or if the weighting of prices is done on the basis of the Congo's budget shares. In the …rst case, freedom-based evaluation tends to exceed welfare-based one while yielding the same qualitative verdict of a steady growth in France over the period. When Congo's budget shares are used, the appraisal of growth is not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively di¤erent from those obtained on the basis of conventional real per capita GDP. For instance, for 2001 and 2003 -two years where growth was considered to be small but positive by welfare-based conventional indicators -the freedom-based measure who uses a weighting of prices as per Congo's budget shares concludes in a reduction of freedom. The reason for this is that, in these two years, the increase in the prices of food products (who represent a large share of Congo's budget and whose prices are weighted more heavily in formula (16)) was su¢ ciently large to outweigh the small increase in nominal income. On the other hand, for the most recent years, the Congo-based freedom evaluation makes one more optimistic about France's performance than what could be inferred from looking at conventional real per capita gdp.
As argued above, the relative congruence between welfare-based and freedom-based measures of living standard should not come up as a big surprise. Even if one adopts the welfarist point of view that budget sets are only important insofar as they provide welfare to the individual who faces them, it is clear that this individual, at least if he or she chooses in a welfare maximizing fashion, will bene…t -welfare-wise -from facing "larger" sets. Freedom can be instrumental to welfare as well as being, possibly, an issue of intrinsic importance. Yet, what is suggested by this …gure is that, while similar, the welfare and freedom based evaluations of growth do lead sometimes to di¤erent qualitative conclusions as to whether or not growth was positive for certain years. This …gure also suggests that the freedom based evaluation of growth is likely to be sensitive to the weighting of the prices used in formula (16) . Obtaining a plausible weighting of prices is therefore an important priority in the agenda of implementation of freedombased indicators of living standards.
International comparisons
Our international comparisons of living standards are based on data provided by the 2005 International Comparison Program (ICP) coordinated by the World Bank. We take from ICP data on per capita GDP and on price level indices for a collection of goods'categories, listed in the appendix. It should be noticed that the 12 group categories used in the ICP are much broader, and therefore less homogenous, than those used by INSEE. Prices indices are used to determine PPP conversion factor of each currency into US dollars, as described by formula (12) , so as to obtain standard PPP adjusted comparisons of per capita GDP. It is important to note that the (complex) method used by the World Bank to construct the reference bundle in the formula (12) does not enable one to assign a clear welfare meaning to international comparisons of PPP adjusted real per capita GDP obtained out of this reference bundle.
Just as we did for the measurement of growth in France, we have treated price indices as if they were the single prices that appear in formulas (15) or (16) . Tables 1a, b and c below provide the ranking of 138 countries based on freedom of choice using, respectively, equal exponents for all prices (formula (15)) and exponents de…ned as the average budget share in US (one of the richest country) and Congo (the poorest). The precise value of each budget share is provided in appendix 2. Table 2 shows the ranking of countries based on conventional welfare-based PPP adjusted per capita GDP comparisons. As can be noticed, rankings of countries are not drastically a¤ected by the choice of the weighting of the goods or by the decision to base the ranking on freedom, rather than welfare, even thought one …nds more di¤erence between the welfare-based PPP per capita ranking and any of the three freedom-based ones than among freedom-based rankings. All rankings agree, for instance, on the fact that Luxembourg and Qatar o¤er the highest per capita standard of living while Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and Guinea-Bissau o¤er the lowest. Ire la n d 7 G re e c e 3 0 B e la ru s 5 3 A z e rb a d ja n 7 6 M o ld ova 9 9 B e n in 1 2 2 S w itz e rla n d 8 C y p riu s 3 1 K a z a k h sta n 5 4 Tu n isia 7 7 P a k ista n 1 0 0 G h a n a 1 2 3 N e th e rla n d 9 Isra e l 3 2 Ve n e z u e la 5 5 A lb a n ia 7 M a c a o 1 2 C z e ch ia 3 5 B o tsw a n a 5 8 E g y p t 8 1 S u d a n 1 0 4 M a li 1 2 7
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H o n g K o n g 1 0 S love n ia 3 3 L e b a n o n 5 6 E g y p t It is also important to notice that, while there are some di¤erences between the three freedom-based rankings of countries that re ‡ect the di¤erent weighting of the prices in formula (16) , the di¤erences are not astonishing and tend to be smaller than those that distinguish either of these three rankings from the conventional PPP adjusted per capita GDP one. This suggests that freedom based rankings of countries are relatively robust to the choice of the weighting factor of the prices.
Measurement of prices in France
We now evaluate the evolution of prices in France according to seven methods: standard Laspeyres, standard Paasche and the …ve harmonic means of prices raised at identical, or di¤erent, exponents, as required by the freedombased approach. As for the measurement of economic growth, our empirical analysis is based on INSEE Harmonized Consumption Price Index and uses, therefore, the same grouping of prices into the 85 categories as in the measurement of growth in France. To make the measurement of in ‡ation ethically meaningful in every year, we perform it as in the formula (13) and (14) using, for every year, the bundle of the previous year as the reference bundle in the Laspeyres approach and the bundle of the current year in the Paasche approach. It is important to notice that, by so doing, we di¤er from INSEE who keeps constant the bundles of reference over all years. As discussed earlier, the INSEE method enables one to compare -welfare wiseany year with the reference year but does not enable ethically meaningful year-to-year comparisons. Figure 4 shows in ‡ation rates according to Laspeyres, Paasche and the …ve geometric means of prices using, as for growth, symmetric weighting of prices and weighting as per the budget share of the corresponding good in France in 1997 and 2007, as well as in Congo and in US. This …gures parallels of course closely what was observed for growth in …gure 2. This is of course not surprising since real growth is, after all, nothing else than nominal growth minus the rate of in ‡ation and that nominal income growth is the same no matter whether it is appraised by a welfare-based or a freedom-based indicator. Here again, one …nds that welfare-based and freedom-based measures of in ‡ation are closer when the weighting of prices in the freedom measures is done according to French budget than with either of the three other weighting methods. Depreciation in purchasing power appears lower when appraised by a freedom-based method that assigns equal weight to all prices as compared to a conventional Laspeyres or Paaschebased evaluation. To the contrary, weighting prices as per the corresponding shares of the goods in the Congo budget leads to an greater evaluation of the depreciation of purchasing power, especially because of the high increase in food prices that have taken place in the second half of the period, an increases that was largely echoed in the popular press. Notice that the verdict as to whether or not in ‡ation was positive may be a¤ected by the choice of the indicator. In 1999 for instance, in ‡ation measured by the freedom-based symmetric geometric mean was mildly negative, while it was positive when measured by the Laspeyres and the Paasche approach or by other freedombased measures. But except for 1999, the qualitative verdict of a yearly depreciation of purchasing power in France -at least for someone with a given income -is obtained for all seven indicators.
Conclusion
We have illustrated in this paper the usefulness of measuring standard of living in a way that re ‡ects the average individual's freedom of choice, rather than his or her welfare as commonly done by usual measures of standard of living. Freedom-based measures have the merit of being clearly interpretable in terms of ethical meaning, a property that is not shared by commonly used indices of living standard such as growth in real GDP or PPP adjusted comparisons of GDP. Freedom-based measures have also the advantage of requiring less information than welfare-based ones since they avoid the need of speci…ying a reference bundle for calculating average prices. Yet, some freedom-based measures require a weighting of prices which can be done according the good budget shares in some representative budget. Doing this however reintroduces the need of specifying a reference budget. As suggested by the illustration, the appraisal of living standard happens to be somewhat sensitive-albeit not outlandishingly so -to the choice of the weightings.
All in all, the normative conclusion obtained out of freedom-based measures of living standards, no matter how the weighting is performed, are not radically di¤erent from those obtained by conventional welfare-based indicators. There are di¤erences, especially in the ranking of countries, or, for some speci…cation of the weightings, for the evaluation of growth in France. But the di¤erences are not huge.
As was mentionned in the text, it is not totally surprising that welfarebased and freedom-based measures of living standard give comparable results. Even if one adopts a welfarist point of view, it is clear that having more freedom in the sense of a budget set with a larger "volume" increases the well-being that this individual can obtain out of the set. Because of this, it is all the more normal that the ordinal ranking obtained from comparing budget sets on the basis of their volume is somewhat similar to the one obtained from performing revealed preference comparisons based on an observed bundle of good that has been choosen from them. In our view, this congruence between easy-to-use and informationally parcimonious freedom-based indicators on the one hand and di¢ cult-to-interpret and informationally demanding welfare-based ones on the other should be seen as an additional argument in favour of the formers, rather than an argument against them.
